Xi Chuan is a Chinese poet, essayist, and translator. He has published numerous poetry collections,
including A Fictitious Family Tree
(1997) and Selected Poems of Xi Chuan,
1986-1996 (2002), in addition to two essay volumes, one book of criticism,
a play, and translations of works by Pound, Borges, and Miłosz, among others.
The recipient of many literary awards in China and abroad, he has held various
international appointments, including New York University and the University of
Victoria, Canada. He teaches Classical
and Modern Chinese Literature at the Central Academy of Fine Arts in Beijing.
Contemporary China, Xi Chuan insists, is a site of paradoxes. In the essay below, written originally (in English) for a symposium the IWP organized in Paros, Greece, on the topic of Home/Land Xi Chuan introduces this wonderland of complementary contradictions to a global audience. A leading avant-garde poet writing during an era of rapid commercialization, he uses poetic devices instead of trite sociology to reflect upon the various cultural and political phenomena manifested in the People’s Republic of China throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Under the banner of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics,” it is money that talks while political slogans are rendered impotent. The marriage of socialism and capitalism has spawned knock-offs of everything from Louis Vuitton wallets to near-replicas of Apple and Ikea stores; in this “realm of fictitious reality,” sometimes the fakes surpass the originals, and even beggars can’t do without cell phones.
-- Jennifer Feeley
In the Shadow of Oxymoron
According
to Collins Dictionary of the English
Language, “oxymoron” means an epigrammatic effect in which contradictory
terms are yoked together. In A Glossary
of Literary Terms, the American critic M. H. Abrams says, “if the
paradoxical utterance conjoins two terms that in ordinary usage are contraries,
it is called an oxymoron.” He cites examples such as John Milton’s “Dark with
excessive bright thy skirts appear,” from Paradise
Lost, and says it is “a frequent figure in devotional prose and religious
poetry as a way of expressing the Christian mysteries, which transcend human
sense and logic.” If we are not so religious, does it mean that all things that
“transcend human sense and logic” need an oxymoron to be expressed? The
following questions arise: to what scale does Adams’ “human sense” pertain, and
whose “logic” does he speak of?
Oxymoron,
a linguistic term. But can we use it in a social sense? I feel an urgent need
to widen the boundary of this word because I am from China, and the modern
Chinese experience, which always “transcend[s] human sense and logic” yet
follows its own sense and logic, shows a preference for paradox and oxymoron.
In the late 1940s, Chairman Mao, describing the nature of the oncoming
socialist system, invented a term: “the people’s democratic dictatorship.” A
dictatorship was going to happen, but it should belong to the people, and
relate to democracy. Is this political term difficult to understand? In the late
1970s, after the Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Deng Xiaoping invented
another term for the Chinese socialism: “Socialism, Chinese style.” Obviously a
revisionist term, it points forward to the concept of “socialist market
economy,” another distinctly socialist oxymoron. Taking its lead from this
oxymoron, China has experienced a rapid growth in economy in the last 30 years.
An
Indian poet once asked me whether the success of today’s Chinese market
economics owes much to Marxism. To be honest, I don’t have a definite answer. Marx
was hostile to the capitalist market, of course, but Marxism brought an egalitarianism
to China which itself laid a foundation for a ready acceptance of economic
reforms. But is Chinese Marxism really a full-strength Marxism? Guo Moruo
(1892-1978), one of the founding fathers of the new Chinese literature and,
from the 1950s on, its most famous hack, wrote in 1941 an essay entitled “Marx
Has Entered the Confucian Temple,” satirizing the Chinese’s acceptance of
Marxism. In it Marx and Confucius meet in a shabby Confucian temple and, to
their surprise, find that they share their main points of view—a harmonious
society, mutual love, communism, etc—with just one exception: Confucius is in
favor of one husband with many wives, whereas Marx prefers one husband with one
wife, a Christian attitude. We know this is a joke, but Guo’s meaning is clear:
Chinese Marxism is located in the shadow of an oxymoron, with Marxism as one
end-pole, Confucianism at the other. Now capitalism comes as the third end. All
these three ends, or four ends, or five ends, embrace each other and make
something wonderful, and funny.
For
instance: the Chinese population is made up by 56 ethnicities, and the
government has in general been kind to the so-called “national minorities.” But
maybe because it is an unbearable task to add further anthropologic
distinctions, the government decided in the 1990s that China does not need any
more ethnic groups. From then on, nobody has been allowed to claim to belong to
a new ethnic group; regardless of ethnicity, everyone also has to obey the
one-couple-one-child policy, a rule devised initially for the Han people making
up more than 90% of China’s population. Another point: although we have 56
ethnicities, people are not so interested in being multi-cultural. Instead,
what you usually find in China is the effort to integrate in terms of national
affairs—a stance that comes right down from the First Emperor of Qin (259-210
BC). The latest in integration: since political slogans are becoming less
influential, many people have turned to thinking that money is something very
good.
Next
example: China has the world’s biggest population of internet and cell-phone
users. Recently I found a picture on the internet showing a street beggar using
a cell-phone. The picture was taken in Shenzhen, a city neighboring Hong Kong. This
exciting situation leads ordinary people in the direction of several different
realms: 1) the realm of free information and free expression, the strengthening
of grass-root culture; 2) the realm of fictitious reality, where people can
enjoy distractions; 3) the realm of no-copyright, where people can examine the
boundary between socialism and capitalism, between good and evil. In the warm
spring of computer viruses, dirty words, and language violence, the Chinese
people are enjoying unprecedented freedom. Meanwhile, the government is trying
to exercise control—for the sake of social stability and so on. Political culture
is looking down on political economy.
Some
thirty years ago, people said that in China “left is right and right is wrong.”
And now, to live in the shadow of oxymoron means to live in embarrassment; it
means to enjoy absurd happiness. Yet to speak in oxymorons means that you are a
person who is not understandable. I am not using words like “contradiction,”
because contradictions are to be blended and eventually dissolved, whereas the
social oxymoron is the reality. Yes, I do know concepts such as freedom,
justice, love, privacy, equality, democracy, the literati, the elites, etc. But
these quasi-saturated concepts are stronger and more popular. The reason why
things are going the way they are lies probably in the fact that overdone
revolution has met half-done modernization. It may also derive from a
geographic condition: although China is big, three fifths of its territory consist
of mountains and plateaus unsuitable for agriculture. You have to learn to go
with this natural condition, in the name of mercy. Even Confucius knew that. Life
is ambiguous and uncertain, while the social oxymoron calls for wild smiles and
spiritual blindness, so that a person with spirit will be equipped to reach in
and explore the secret core of history—if one really exists.
In
2004, a law of Private Ownership of Fortunes was officially passed in China.
But whether one can really own his or her apartment or house remains in
question. As for land, or buildings on the land, in theory you cannot own it
privately because in theory China is a country with a system of public
ownership even while it practices market economy. Here we can see clearly the
oxymoron-like nature of the Chinese society: market economy on the one hand,
public ownership on the other. Even if you built the house with your own hands,
you can only rent it for possession for a maximum period of 70 years. After the
limit of 70 years, the law asks you to re-rent it. In the formulation of the
sociologist Fei Xiaotong, the Chinese social structure, supported by vertical
relationships, is totally different from the Western social structure,
supported by horizontal relationships. So if a Chinese is not able to pass on
his fortune to his or her offspring, he or she has to disperse it in other ways—good
or bad.
And since
China is a secular country, for the Chinese there is no Other China or Utopian
China. There is no other way to go. To live the life of oxymoron is something
one must study one’s entire life. If you try to understand China from one
perspective alone, you are bound to fail.
Jennifer Feeley teaches modern Chinese literature in the Department of Asian and Slavic Languages and
Literatures at the University of Iowa.